This article describes how the Trade Facilities Act (TFA) and the liquidation of certain governmentowned assets spurred the industrial intervention of the Bank of England in the 1920s. What emerges is a much greater role of the Treasury in the Bank of England's industrial intervention than has been hitherto suggested. This essay places the theme of the Bank of England's industrial intervention within the broader discussions about Treasury history and Britain's post-war reconstruction, and refines the argument that the original involvement of the Bank of England with industry merely represented an extension of its pre-war operations of branch banking and its duties as a central bank. 
4 4 Yet, overall, previous scholarship tends not to lend much weight to the Treasury as a possible factor at work behind the increasing intervention of the Bank of England in industry. Howson, Burke, Booth, Peden, and -although from a different perspective -Daunton have demonstrated that the Treasury -whose overarching preoccupation from1919 until the mid-1920s was the restoration of the gold standard at pre-war parity, a goal which implied, among other things, a tight monetary policy and a dramatic reduction of public spending -extended considerably its functions from the end of the war throughout the inter-war period. Then, the question is: did the Treasury and its postwar strategy of financial restoration add to what Bowden and Collins term the 'pressure of circumstances' in changing the mandate and central banking practice of the Bank of England? This essay concludes that the Treasury and post-war financial restoration contributed significantly to shape the form and direction of the Bank of England's early industrial intervention, which did not stem from its ordinary functions alone. Reduction of public expenditure, dear money, the tax reform, mass-unemployment and the restoration of the pre-war financial system in the first half of the 1920s -it is argued here -all formed the background in which the Bank of England began to get involved with industry. These points will be made more concrete when charting the evolution of the TFA and of the 'Securities Trust'(SET), key aspects in the Bank of England's industrial intervention in the 1920s hitherto neglected by historians. The former represented the most significant reflationary measure that British governments implemented in the 1920s; the latter was a holding company that the Treasury and the Bank of England jointly set up in 1924 to dispose of certain government-owned assets. Although in very differing ways and with a time-lag of a few years, the TFA and SET, as will be seen here, spurred Treasury and Bank of England industrial intervention.
The debate about Treasury history will be here of particular significance in explaining the motives of the Bank of England's early involvement with industry. 13 Treasury and monetary historians agree that the Bank of England enjoyed undisputed independence from the Treasury until 13 Peden; The Treasury, Kynaston 'The Bank'; Burk, 'The Treasury' 5 5 1914, and that the war, while prompting closer relations between the Treasury and the City, marked a shift in power from the Bank of England to the Treasury. 14 Kynaston concludes that the Bank of England only retained 'operational independence' from the Treasury. 15 He also suggests that the crossover, which would have been inconceivable until 1914, of certain officials (notably Otto E.
Niemeyer, Sir Basil Blackett and Sir Joshiah Stamp) from the Treasury to the Bank of England in the latter half of the 1920s testifies to this shift in power. 16 As will be seen here, the role that these officials, whose grip of Treasury machinery grew with government instability in the 1920s, Table 1 and 2 estimate the industrial investments of the Bank of England in the inter-war era. While providing some insights into the size and timing of the Bank of England's industrial intervention, these tables suggest that intervention was not triggered by branch banking and bank rescuing operations alone. Alongside a number of government-owned securities held by SET, the Bank of
I
England accumulated a host of debt issues guaranteed by the Treasury under the TFA -in particular, the debt issues of 'North British Aluminium Co.Ltd', the 'Stanton Iron Works' and the 'North Wales Power Co.Ltd' exhibited in Table 2 . These deserve some attention here.
As will soon be seen, the TFA enabled certain firms to borrow under Treasury guarantee, and triggered Treasury and Bank of England intervention in industry when, by the late 1920s, those firms became unable to repay their guaranteed debt. The TFA has only received a passing mention in most histories of Britain's inter-war economic policy. Before dwelling on the question as to how it spurred the industrial intervention of the Bank of England and the Treasury, it is, therefore, necessary briefly to sketch its history.
The TFA followed from a proposal that Hilton Young, the financial secretary to the Treasury, put forward during the discussions which took place at Gairloch, Scotland, late in September 1921, when the coalition government led by Lloyd George devised a package of measures to relieve unemployment, which had grown dramatically since April 1920 as a result of both credit stringency and the post-war slump.
18
The Young proposal sought to reconcile the mounting request for government intervention with the orthodox view of the Treasury. 19 Two elements characterised it. The first was that the state should assist industry without increasing monetary circulation, held responsible, in Treasury's mind, for mass-unemployment through price-inflation and increasing monetary wages. 20 The second was that this assistance should only be temporary in order not to hinder the reduction of wages, a precondition to the decrease in unemployment. State assistance, the argument went, 'should enable works to be undertaken' and 'would give by its initiative an impulse towards industrial revival'. This impulse was to come in the form of Treasury guarantees of interest and capital to be raised by the borrower in order to complete major capital works. The rationale was to 7 7 speed up large-scale investments, when new hikes in interest rates, and expectation for their reduction, delayed the execution of these capital works. Young's original scheme -it should be stressed -also envisaged a 'National Development Loan' to be raised in order to counteract possible inflation arising from the increased expenditure of the Treasury.
21
The TFA was passed in November 1921 and renewed until 1927. The limits upon guarantees were progressively increased from 25 to 75 million pounds, and, by 1924, also foreign companies and firms operating in the Empire, but making their purchases in Britain, were allowed to borrow under its auspices. 22 Keynes noted in June 1924 that the TFA, although pointing 'the way to a new method of administering an important part of the savings of the public', was not innovative enough, for it did not reduce the risk of enterprise. 'It is -concluded Keynes -a modest subsidy'.
23
This conclusion does not seem to hold valid when the total debt issues and the projects guaranteed by the Treasury under the TFA (see Table 3 and 4) are taken under consideration.
Guaranteed debt issues were executed mostly in three sectors: shipbuilding, shipping and metallurgy (see Table 4 ). These tables seem to suggest that Treasury guarantees shifted significant financial resources from potentially profitable investments (public debt and new industries) to unprofitable and over-exanded industries (shipbuilding in particular). These also point to the conclusion that the TFA very probably constituted a sine qua non to the survival of certain staple industries in Britain in the 1920s. Given the financial and trade conditions of Britain in that decade, it is very unlikely that, without Treasury guarantees, those sectors would have attracted such a large amount of capital -more than £63 million within four years -via debt issues. As Thomas emphasised, the success of debt issues, unlike equity issues, depended, to a considerable extent, on the reputation of the borrowers, and the reputation of shipping, shipbuilding and metallurgical firms was increasingly prejudiced by spring 1920. The fact that the TFA interfered with the traditional working of the money market, thus representing a major innovation in industrial finance, constituted the main reason why the Bank of England and the Treasury opposed its renewal after 1921. The Bank of England and the Treasury feared that the TFA would reduce the market for government debt, increasing its costs and delaying the return to the gold standard, and that, in addition, it would stimulate their involvement with industry, had the firms enjoying its benefits been unable to pay the interest on guaranteed loans.
Late in 1926, Norman strongly advised against TFA assistance to Beardmore on the grounds that 'the Exchequer can ill afford such guarantees' and that 'in the event of Goverment intervention, it will be difficult to limit the amount to any reasonable figure'. 
II
The Bank of England intervened in industry in conjunction with the Treasury also to liquidate certain stakes that the government had acquired during the war (see Table 2 , the entry SET). The Bank'), SET was finally incorporated in January 1924. Table 5 exhibits the assets that SET took from the Disposal and Liquidation Commission, whereas Tables 6 and 7 ) and followed the speculative waves in equity shares which took place in Britain in the inter-war period (in 1919-20; in 1927-9; and after 1934 National Expenditures' in 1918-9. 59 Mounting demands for the reduction of expenditure and taxation formed the background to these developments: these made any formal link between the Treasury and SET politically unviable. As a result of this, the Treasury decided that the Bank of England would wholly control it.
60
One reason as to why the Treasury entrusted the Bank of England with the disposal of the government-owned industrial assets is clearly to be found in the relations of the latter with the City, crucial to their successful liquidation. Probably, the Treasury involved the Bank of England with this task also because of the latter's funds and reserves. As will be seen later, the disposal of those assets was an expensive business, whereas Treasury resources were increasingly limited. How large the funds of the Bank of England were is unclear, for it did not publish balance sheets and profitand-loss accounts in the time-period under consideration. However, as the 'Select Committee on National Expenditures' emphasised, the profits of the Bank of England -a joint-stock banking company until its nationalisation in 1946 -grew remarkably during the war, and very likely, as interest rates went up and public debt grew, also in the subsequent period. Celanese operated. 63 Coleman spelled out that British Celanese constituted not only a shining example of technological 'spin off', but also an instance of war time relations between business and government. 64 A sub-committee of the 'Select Committee on National Expenditure' threw much light on those relations in 1918-9.
65
The sub-committee revealed that the main promoters of British Celanese, 66 The sub-committee also emphasised that other potential producers of acetate, primarily Courtaulds and United Alkali Co, were not even asked to tender, whereas British Celanese had been unable to supply the agreed quantity of acetate, which the Ministry of Munitions continued to import it from
France until the end of the war. In addition, the Dreyfus brothers and their British associatesalleged the sub-committee -employed public money to enter into the rayon industry and to set subsidiaries abroad.
67
The fact that the idea of spinning acetate was put forward before the First World War and that British Celanese set up subsidiaries in Canada and in the USA in 1918-9 seemed to substantiate these allegations. However, the moral argument was probably over-emphasised by the press and the although it paid dividends only by the late 1930s. This is not necessarily indicative, however, of an unsound investment policy. The success of British Celanese must rather be found in its innovative strategy of integration between rayon, textiles and chemicals, as well as in the impact that the company made on the British rayon industry.
These developments beg the question as to whether Churchill imposed the import duty on rayon to smooth the reconstruction of British Celanese.
Tolliday argued that this tariff, as with government intervention in the acetate business, was 'a matter of national strategic importance'. 83 Whether, however, there was a clear industrial vision behind this intervention, as already seen, is debatable. Churchill imposed the rayon tariff for revenue purposes: the tax reform and the introduction of a pension system, as well as the erroneous assumption that rayon as with silk was a luxury, formed its background. 84 The import duty, moreover, was accompanied by a duty on domestic consumption (the excise rayon duty), a fact which confirms that its primary purpose was not to shelter this trade. On its part, the Treasury 20 granted, in the words of Barstow, no 'exceptional treatment' to British Celanese, partly to avert criticism from Parliament and Courtaulds, partly as a result of its laissez-faire approach when it came to industrial matters. 85 Little wonder that in 1929 the Treasury rejected a request from
Courtaulds to eliminate the excise duty. 86 The implication of Courtaulds' proposal was to leave the import duty unaltered, and this -argued the Treasury -would have implied a measure of protection which was impossible to defend in Parliament and which was far in excess of anything hitherto granted to industries which were sheltered under the Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921. a stable influence over the former Habsburg Empire. 91 After that BEC became a French bank and its capital was increased from 64 to 100 million francs, the Bank of England transmuted its credit into debt certificates worth £1.75 million. Although it was controlled by 'Paribas', British interests in BEC were sizeable. 92 The Bank of England transmuted its credit with AAB into an interest of almost £1 million (£375 thousand of ordinary shares and £625 thousand of old ordinary shares). 93 In addition, it subscribed to a debt issue of £700 thousand and made a cash advance of £400 thousand in conjunction with the merchant bank Glynn Mills. In order to avert its acquisition by the Italian- (BTC), with which AAB merged into AIB in 1927. 94 This merger proved fairly expensive for the Bank of England that took over, in exchange for £934 thousand arising from the liquidation of the Gold Austrian Bonds held by SET (see Table 6 ), 600 thousand ordinary shares of AIB. In 1928, SET liquidated this holding, but as early as 1929-30 it bought a small interest (80 thousand shares) and advanced £100 thousand to help AIB cover the expenses (£344 thousand) arising from the 23 23 acquisition of BTC. This help came after that the Treasury had refused to lend £300 thousand to AIB. 95 After this operation, however, AIB never prospered (it was finally liquidated in 1951).
AIB fell within a strategy which aimed at laying the foundations of industrial credit in Britain and at furthering a major trade offensive in foreign outlets, and which certain armament interests, (Vickers and Armstrong) began to formulate in connection with important interests of the City (Glynn Mills) since the war years. These objectives went hand in hand in the intention of those interests: the heavy industry, which exported the bulk of its output, and certain houses of the City, whose investments had stimulated those exports in the past. Probably, it was no coincidence that the leading figure of AIB was Sir Alexander Herbert Lawrence, representative of Glynn Mills, a director of BEC and chairman of 'Vickers-Armstrong Ltd', the company resulting from the merger of the armament branches of Vickers and Armstrong, which took place -it should be stressed -in concomitance with the launch of AIB.
Along with a number of deposit banks and metallurgical concerns, the same interests Experiments of indirect intervention -concluded Bradbury -were more likely to fail and, in this sense, these were more likely to pave the way for the restoration the 'old British sanity' in industrial credit. In broad lines -it should be noted -this was the same argument that Norman joint stock banking -also followed by the Bank of England -by which resources should not be 'locked up' in one single investment for a long period. 107 Secondly, and more broadly, given the growing weight of both Armstrong and the government within Britain's wartime economy, it would not be entirely surprising that, during the war, the Bank of England invested in Armstrong under government pressure.
More To sum up, it seems that the factors at work behind the early involvement of the Bank of England with industry were more complex than has been hitherto suggested. The history of the TFA and SET conveys three conclusions in particular. The first is that the Bank of England was not independent from the Treasury when intervening in industry. 'The government, through the Treasury -wrote Norman in 1941 -seeks continuously the advice of the Bank of England, but retains undivided responsibility for major questions of policy…the Bank of England remains the administrative agent' of the government. 110 There was probably some exaggeration in this 27 27 statement. As the vicissitudes of the failed intervention in the film industry in the latter half of 1930s illustrate, the Bank of England was able to avert Treasury interference when intervening in industry. 111 Yet there was some truth in these words: as also the episode of the TFA and SET indicates, the weight that Norman and the rationalisation creed had in Bank of England industrial intervention has probably been overstated by historians. Another conclusion is that this intervention was designed to be temporary. The new evidence is fully consistent with the argument that the Treasury pursued a 'facilitative economy strategy' 112 aimed at the re-establishment of a free-market economy in the 1920s. It also shows, however, that deflation, through mass-unemployment (a major motive behind the imposition of the TFA) and reduced public expenditure (a major motive behind the setting up of SET), seems to have prolonged Treasury and Bank of England industrial intervention, which found, however, its roots in the over-expansion of staple industries and of the public sector during the war.
The episode of the TFA and SET is also significant because of the insights it offers into the motives of the Bank of England's intervention in industry in the 1930s. Historians agree that the Bank of England intervened in industry to avoid government intervention and keep relations between the City and industry unaltered. The new evidence -especially the episode of BTC -seems to suggest that the Treasury contributed to shape this defensive strategy, which began to be formulated during the war. Total Assets/Liabilities (£ 000,) 
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